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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
We are asked to review the District Court's order granting 
in part and denying in part Joseph Szuchon's petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254. A 
Pennsylvania jury convicted Szuchon of first-degree murder 
of his former girlfriend, Judy Snyder, during a nighttime 
rampage which we describe in detail below. The jury then 
sentenced him to death. Szuchon asserted numerous 
claims of error in his habeas petition in connection with 
both the trial and sentencing. 
 
The District Court denied relief on all trial phase claims, 
and Szuchon cross-appeals from that judgment. For the 
reasons set forth below, we will grant Szuchon a certificate 
of appealability for his claims regarding the admission of 
certain psychiatric evidence in violation of Estelle v. Smith, 
451 U.S. 454 (1981), but we will affirm the District Court's 
denial of relief. A certificate of appealability will be denied 
on the remaining trial phase claims. 
 
As to the sentencing phase, the District Court held that 
the jury instructions regarding the mitigating 
circumstances violated the holding of Mills v. Maryland, 
486 U.S. 367 (1988), and it granted the writ on the 
condition that the state court conduct a new sentencing 
proceeding or impose a term of life imprisonment. The 
Commonwealth appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the Mills 
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claim is procedurally defaulted because Szuchon failed to 
exhaust his Mills claim in state court, and state remedies 
are now foreclosed. Although we conclude that the 
Commonwealth may have waived this defense by failing to 
raise it in its answer to the habeas petition, we will address 
the question of whether the claim is procedurally defaulted. 
We conclude that the Mills claim is defaulted and barred 
from review on the merits given Szuchon's inability to show 
cause or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 
Consequently, Szuchon cannot pursue habeas relief based 
on Mills. Szuchon, however, also cross-appeals from the 
denial of his remaining sentencing claims, one of which was 
that the state court improperly permitted the exclusion at 
voir dire of six prospective jurors who merely voiced 
opposition to the death penalty. We hold that the exclusion 
of the prospective jurors violated Szuchon's Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments rights under Witherspoon v. 
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 
U.S. 412 (1985), and thus a new sentencing is required. 
Accordingly, we will affirm, on other grounds, the District 





We borrow the factual recitation from one of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinions in this matter: 
 
       The events culminating in an evening of terror on 
       April 14, 1981 for three young people in Erie County 
       began with the breakdown of [Szuchon]'s relationship 
       with Judy Lynn Snyder and his inability to deal with 
       that breakdown. [Szuchon] and Ms. Snyder had been 
       involved in a stormy relationship over a period of 
       several years, including periods of time in which they 
       lived together in California and in Philadelphia. Toward 
       the end of 1980, Ms. Snyder left [Szuchon] in 
       Philadelphia and returned to her parents' home in Erie. 
 
       Refusing to accept that the relationship was over, 
       [Szuchon] began to harass Ms. Snyder with telephone 
       calls at her parents' home. [Szuchon]'s love for Judy 
       Snyder progressively transformed to hatred and he 
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       began to tell various people how he was going to kill 
       her with a Winchester rifle or cut her from ear to ear 
       -- if he could not have her, no one would. Eventually, 
       [Szuchon] returned to Erie to pursue Ms. Snyder. 
 
       In Erie, [Szuchon] continued to harass Judy Snyder at 
       her parents' home, with Erie police being dispatched to 
       the home on two occasions to remove [Szuchon] from 
       the premises. [Szuchon] also continued to tell others 
       that he intended to kill Ms. Snyder as well as her 
       "boyfriend." Finally, on April 14, 1981, [Szuchon] 
       purchased a Winchester rifle from Gorenflo's Gunsmith 
       in Erie, purchased bullets from the Erie Sport Store, 
       loaded the rifle and drove to the Bottom Line, a 
       restaurant/tavern where Judy Snyder was working. 
 
       [Szuchon] parked in the lot of the Bottom Line and 
       read a newspaper while he waited for Ms. Snyder to get 
       off work. When her shift was finished, she and two 
       friends, Aldo DeSanto and Mary Sadowski, left the 
       Bottom Line to go to Judy's car, whereupon the three 
       were confronted by [Szuchon], holding the Winchester 
       and stating "If you all don't get into the car, I'll blow 
       your fucking heads off.". . . All four then got in Ms. 
       Snyder's car with Judy driving, Mary in the front 
       passenger seat, and Aldo in the back seat with 
       [Szuchon]. 
 
       [Szuchon] then directed Ms. Snyder to drive to an 
       isolated area, the state game lands. As they drove, 
       [Szuchon] kept the gun pointed at them and, at one 
       point, told the three to "make your act of contrition or 
       say your confessions if you want to go to heaven 
       because at the end of this night I'm surely going to 
       hell." . . . Mary Sadowski, certain she was going to die 
       at [Szuchon]'s hands, jumped from the moving car (at 
       50 m.p.h.) and escaped. . . . Somehow she avoided 
       serious injury, ran to a house and called the police. 
 
       [Szuchon] ordered Ms. Snyder to continue to drive to 
       the game lands. Upon arrival there (the drive took 
       approximately 15-20 minutes), he ordered her and Mr. 
       DeSanto to walk into a corn field. The latter took 
       several steps into the field, but Ms. Snyder refused. 
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       When she persisted in refusing to go on, [Szuchon] 
       aimed the gun at Ms. Snyder, she turned, and 
       [Szuchon] shot her in the back. Mr. DeSanto jumped to 
       the ground, rolled, then got up and ran. While running, 
       he heard two more shots. He finally reached a 
       farmhouse and the owners called the police. 
 
       Shortly thereafter, Pennsylvania State Troopers arrived 
       at the scene and discovered Ms. Snyder's abandoned 
       car, and then located her body. She had been killed by 
       two bullets that had pierced her back from different 
       angles. [Szuchon] was nowhere to be found, and a 
       police manhunt was initiated. 
 
       Later that evening, Frederick Pusch was driving his 
       vehicle on an isolated road south of Erie when he 
       encountered [Szuchon] who informed Mr. Pusch that 
       his car had broken down and that he needed to use a 
       phone. Mr. Pusch drove [Szuchon] to Pusch's cottage at 
       Canadohta Lake. While at the cottage, [Szuchon] 
       informed Mr. Pusch that he had just killed his 
       girlfriend and that another girl and a guy had gotten 
       away. The next morning (April 15th), [Szuchon] placed 
       a message with the Erie Police Department requesting 
       that an officer with whom he was acquainted, Detective 
       Richard Runstedler, come to Canadohta Lake so that 
       he could turn himself in. Detective Runstedler and 
       another officer drove to Canadohta Lake and took 
       [Szuchon] into their custody at approximately 12:15 
       p.m. on April 15, 1981. 
 
       . . . [Szuchon] was taken to the state police barracks 
       where he was given his Miranda warnings, which he 
       waived. [Szuchon] then confessed to kidnaping the 
       three victims at gunpoint, intending to take them to 
       the country to kill them. [Szuchon] stated that he 
       intended to kill them because Judy would not return to 
       him as his girlfriend, and because he perceived Aldo as 
       "cutting in on him" and felt that Mary was meddling 
       and interfering with his relationship with Judy. 
       [Szuchon]'s version of the events was essentially 
       consistent with the testimony of the two kidnap 
       victims. [Szuchon] told Trooper Povlick that he told Ms. 
       Snyder "how much he loved her, and at this point she 
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       laughed and turned her back and he shot her." . .. 
       [Szuchon] also informed Trooper Povlick that he had, 
       the day of the homicide/kidnaping, ingested a "couple 
       lines" of cocaine and "five to six quaalude tablets." 
       . . . No evidence of drugs or paraphernalia were found 
       on [Szuchon]. 
 
Commonwealth v. Szuchon, 484 A.2d 1365, 1368-69 (Pa. 
1984). 
 
In October 1981, a jury in the Court of Common Pleas for 
Erie County convicted Szuchon of first-degree murder, 
three counts of kidnaping, two counts of terroristic threats, 
and two counts of reckless endangerment. The jury 
acquitted Szuchon on a charge of attempted murder of Aldo 
DeSanto. A sentencing proceeding was conducted before 
the same jury shortly after the verdict. Neither the 
Commonwealth nor Szuchon introduced new evidence at 
sentencing. The Commonwealth argued the existence of two 
statutory aggravating circumstances: Szuchon committed 
the killing while in perpetration of a felony (kidnaping), and 
he knowingly created a grave risk of death to individuals 
(DeSanto and Sadowski) other than the murder victim. See 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. SS 9711(d)(6) and (7). Szuchon argued 
four mitigating circumstances: although he pled guilty to a 
robbery charge in 1974, he had no "significant history" of 
prior convictions; he was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance; his capacity to appreciate 
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of law was substantially impaired; and 
"other evidence of mitigation"-- namely, that he "was 
substantially involved in the usage and abuse of drugs and 
alcohol for a long period of time." Appendix ("App.") 3156; 
see SS 9711(e)(1), (2), (3), and (8). The jury found both of the 
aggravating circumstances and certain of the mitigating 
circumstances to exist, and it concluded that the mitigating 
circumstances were outweighed. Consequently, it imposed 
a sentence of death on the first-degree murder conviction.1 
See S 9711(c)(iv). The trial court denied Szuchon's motion 
for a new trial, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Szuchon received consecutive terms of incarceration on the other 
convictions. 
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affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. 
Commonwealth v. Szuchon, 484 A.2d 1365 (Pa. 1984). 
 
At trial, Szuchon had not denied that he committed the 
murder but presented a diminished-capacity defense, 
"which entails the assertion that the defendant's mental 
condition at the time of the offense was such that he was 
incapable of forming the specific intent to kill." 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 732 A.2d 1167, 1190 (Pa. 1999) 
(citing Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 454 A.2d 937, 943 
(Pa. 1982)).2 Szuchon tried to show, through testimony from 
the prosecution's witnesses, that he had ingested cocaine 
and sedatives on the date of the murder, resulting in a 
diminished capacity. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
aptly rendered the following assessment of Szuchon's 
defense: 
 
       The only evidence as to [Szuchon]'s diminished 
       capacity and his drugged or intoxicated condition came 
       from [Szuchon] himself, through statements he had 
       made to various people subsequent to the 
       murder/kidnaping. This evidence was vague and 
       equivocal and was overwhelmingly countered by the 
       testimony of Aldo DeSanto, Mary Sadowski, Frederick 
       Pusch (who was a teacher of the emotionally 
       disturbed), the salesmen who sold [Szuchon] the rifle 
       and bullets, the arresting officers and others, that on 
       April 14 and 15, 1981, [Szuchon] was calm, deliberate 
       and coherent and exhibited no signs of intoxication or 
       drugged condition. Moreover, the Commonwealth 
       introduced Dr. Walter Finken, a psychiatrist at Warren 
       State Hospital who had examined [Szuchon], discussed 
       his participation in the crimes with him and testified 
       that in his opinion, at the time of the incident 
       [Szuchon] was able to comprehend the nature and the 
       quality of his acts, knew right from wrong, and was 
       capable of forming the specific intent to commit 
       murder. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. By negating the element of specific intent, a successful diminished- 
capacity defense reduces the charge from first to third-degree murder. 
Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 359 (Pa. 1995). 
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Szuchon, 484 A.2d at 1369. 
 
In 1986, Szuchon filed a pro se petition for state 
collateral review under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act 
("PCHA"). The trial court appointed counsel, who filed an 
amended petition raising claims of trial court error and of 
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The 
trial court denied the petition without an evidentiary 
hearing, ruling that the claims were either meritless or 
procedurally barred because they had been litigated on 
direct appeal. The Superior Court affirmed, and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance to appeal. 
 
In 1992, Szuchon filed a second counseled collateral- 
review petition, this time under the amended and renamed 
Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
S 9541 et seq. Szuchon again raised claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The trial court 
ruled that the claims were waived either because they were 
previously litigated or because Szuchon failed to raise them 
in a prior proceeding. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
affirmed. Commonwealth v. Szuchon, 633 A.2d 1098 (Pa. 
1993). 
 
In April 1994, the Governor of Pennsylvania signed a 
warrant for Szuchon's execution. On July 1, 1994, Szuchon 
moved for a stay and filed a counseled habeas petition 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254 in the District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania.3 After the District Court 
granted the stay, but before the Commonwealth filed an 
answer to the habeas petition, Szuchon moved to hold the 
proceeding in abeyance and to continue the stay while he 
exhausted state remedies on three claims that he had yet 
to present to the state courts.4 The District Court granted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Szuchon had filed two previous habeas petitions, in 1985 and 1990, 
both of which were dismissed without prejudice. 
4. The three claims were (1) failure to instruct the jury that a life 
sentence means no parole, Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 
(1994); (2) a Fifth Amendment violation in the admission of Dr. Walter 
Finken's testimony and his report, Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); 
and (3) a double jeopardy violation in permitting the jury to consider the 
aggravating circumstance of creating a grave risk of death to Aldo 
DeSanto after it had acquitted Szuchon of the attempted murder of 
DeSanto. Szuchon conceded that the Simmons claim had not been 
presented to the state courts, and he noted that the Estelle and double- 
jeopardy claims "appear not to have been exhausted." App. 184-85. 
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Szuchon's motion, held the proceeding in abeyance, and 
ordered the stay continued. 
 
In January 1996, Szuchon returned to state court and 
filed a third post-conviction petition (his second petition 
under the PCRA). The trial court ruled that the claims were 
either previously litigated or waived for failure to raise them 
in a prior proceeding. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
affirmed. Commonwealth v. Szuchon, 693 A.2d 959 (Pa.), 
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 889 (1997). 
 
In March 1998, Szuchon filed in the District Court an 
amended habeas petition in which he raised a total of 16 
claims of error at trial and sentencing. The Commonwealth 
filed an answer in which it expressly waived nonexhaustion 
as to all claims. App. 284-85 ("To the extent that Petitioner 
may have failed to exhaust available state remedies as to 
any claim presented in the instant Petition, the 
Commonwealth formally waives any non-exhaustion 
defense it may have available."). As to the numerous claims 
that Szuchon had presented to the state courts in his 
second and third post-conviction petitions, the 
Commonwealth argued that those claims were procedurally 
defaulted, and it argued that the claim under Mills was 
either barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), or 
without substantive merit. The Commonwealth did not 
assert a procedural-default defense in its answer to the 
Mills claim. 
 
The matter was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who 
concluded that all claims were exhausted and not 
defaulted. Applying pre-AEDPA law because Szuchon's 
initial habeas petition was filed prior to AEDPA's 
enactment, the Magistrate Judge recommended that all 
claims but one be denied, agreeing with Szuchon that the 
jury instructions at sentencing violated the Eighth 
Amendment under Mills. The Magistrate Judge 
recommended that the writ be granted on the condition 
that the Commonwealth either conduct a new sentencing 
hearing within 120 days or impose life imprisonment. 
 
The Commonwealth objected to the recommendation by 
arguing for the first time that the Mills claim should be 
denied as procedurally defaulted given Szuchon's failure to 
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exhaust the claim and the present unavailability of state 
remedies. The District Court summarily overruled the 
objections, adopted the Report and Recommendation, 
granted the writ in accordance with the Magistrate Judge's 
recommendation, and denied Szuchon's remaining claims. 
The District Court also issued a certificate of appealability 
but failed to specify the issues on which Szuchon had made 
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 
See 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(3) ("The certificate of appealability 
. . . shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the 
showing required . . . ."). The Commonwealth timely 
appealed (C.A. No. 00-9000), and Szuchon timely cross- 
appealed (C.A. No. 00-9001). 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(a). We have jurisdiction over the Commonwealth's 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. As to Szuchon's 
cross-appeal, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
SS 2253 and 1291 over the issues that satisfy the certificate 
of appealability standard. See United States v. Cepero, 224 
F.3d 256, 261-62 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that 
issuance of a certificate of appealability is a jurisdictional 
requirement). Because the District Court failed to specify 
the issues for appeal, we will undertake that analysis here.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Ordinarily, when a District Court grants a certificate of appealability 
but fails to specify the issues for appeal, we would remand the matter for 
a clarification of the order granting the certificate. See, e.g., United 
States 
v. Weaver, 195 F.3d 52, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1999). We have elected not to 
follow that course here, as the parties had fully briefed this matter by 
the time it was brought to our attention that the certificate of 
appealability was inadequate. See Williams v. United States, 150 F.3d 
639, 641 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that remand for specification of the 
issues was unnecessary where appeal was fully briefed); Tiedeman v. 
Benson, 122 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir. 1997) (same). Moreover, given that 
20 years have now passed since Szuchon's trial, we are reluctant to 
delay the resolution of this matter with a remand. We, therefore, will 
view the District Court's certificate as a nullity given its nonconformity 
to S 2253(c)(3), and we construe Szuchon's timely filed notice of appeal 
as a request for this Court to issue a certificate of appealability. See 
Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Because Coady 
filed a timely notice of appeal, we construe this notice as a request for 
a certificate of appealability pursuant to Section 2253(c)(1) and Fed. R. 
App. Proc. 22(b)."). 
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A certificate of appealability may issue only upon"a 
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 
28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(2). If "a district court has rejected the 
constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to 
satisfy S 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must 
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 
court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or 
wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Our 
review is plenary on the merits of the claims over which we 
have jurisdiction, as the District Court relied exclusively on 
the state court record in deciding the petition and did not 
hold an evidentiary hearing. Hartey v. Vaughn , 186 F.3d 
367, 371 (3d Cir. 1999). In addition, Szuchon filed his 
initial petition prior to AEDPA's enactment, and the parties 
do not dispute that pre-AEDPA law governs Szuchon's 
claims. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997).6 
Before AEDPA, state court factual findings were presumed 
correct unless, inter alia, they were not" `fairly supported 
by the record.' " Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 864 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (quoting the former 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(8)). State 
court legal conclusions were reviewed de novo, as were 
mixed questions of law and fact. McCandless v. Vaughn, 
172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
III. TRIAL CLAIMS 
 
We first address Szuchon's cross-appeal from the denial 
of his claims of error in connection with the trial. His 
claims involve his right to due process, and his contention 
that psychiatric evidence was not properly obtained and 
was improperly used at trial. The District Court properly 
reached the merits of these claims. 
 
A. Due Process Claims 
 
Szuchon contends that he was denied a fair trial because 
the jury was prejudiced by comments it overheard; the jury 
engaged in premature deliberations; the court ordered him 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Although this action was commenced in the District Court pre-AEDPA, 
this appeal was filed post-AEDPA, and thus we must apply the AEDPA 
certificate of appealability requirement. Slack , 529 U.S. at 482. 
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shackled during the proceedings; and he was provided 
insufficient notice that he faced the death penalty. We will 
deny a certificate of appealability on each claim. 
 
1. Prejudicial Comments 
 
Szuchon's jury was sequestered throughout the trial, and 
while out for dinner one weekend, a patron at a local 
restaurant commented "hang the bastard" as three jurors 
were entering the establishment. On a separate occasion 
during that weekend, a patron at a different restaurant 
remarked "he is guilty" within earshot of three different 
jurors. The court's tipstaff promptly reported these 
incidents the following Monday. Before resuming trial that 
morning, the court conducted an individual voir dire with 
each of the six jurors who were exposed to the remarks. 
Each juror stated that the remarks would have no adverse 
affect on their ability to remain impartial and to decide the 
case solely on the evidence. 
 
It is settled that "due process does not require a new trial 
every time a juror has been placed in a potentially 
compromising situation." Smith v. Phillips , 455 U.S. 209, 
217 (1982). Instead, "[d]ue process means a jury capable 
and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before 
it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial 
occurrences and to determine the effect of such 
occurrences when they happen." Id. Here, after learning of 
the restaurant incidents, the judge promptly questioned the 
jurors, each of whom separately and unequivocally stated 
that the remarks would not affect their ability to decide the 
case based on the evidence. After assessing the jurors' 
credibility and observing their demeanor, the court found 
that they would remain impartial and could continue to 
serve. The record amply supports this finding, and we defer 
to its correctness on federal habeas review. Patton v. Yount, 
467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984). In addition, we reject 
Szuchon's suggestion that the court was required to 
question the jury as a whole; the judge was plainly within 
his discretion in choosing to limit the questioning to the six 
jurors who were exposed to the remarks. The record before 
us provides no basis for second-guessing the trial judge's 
handling of the situation. 
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Szuchon also contends that he was denied due process 
by another alleged instance of improper jury contact. He 
claims that, after he physically assaulted a state trooper 
who was leaving the witness stand (an incident that 
resulted in his shackling, which will be discussed below), 
the jury was escorted from the courtroom, at which time 
the court's tipstaff allegedly remarked that Szuchon's 
behavior was the "worst . . . he had seen in his many years 
of service at the courthouse." This incident was not brought 
to the trial judge's attention. We are satisfied, nevertheless, 
that the tipstaff's remark was not of the sort that could 
have posed a threat to the jury's impartiality in its 
consideration of the rather overwhelming evidence of 
Szuchon's guilt of first-degree murder. The remark, while 
inappropriate, did not deprive Szuchon of a fair trial. 
 
2. Premature Deliberations 
 
Szuchon alleges that the jury voted to convict him of 
first-degree murder by the third day of the prosecution's 
case, and that it decided to impose a death sentence by the 
fourth or fifth day. He has submitted a declaration to this 
effect from one member of the jury. These alleged 
premature deliberations were not brought to the trial 
court's attention. Although these allegations are certainly 
troubling in the abstract, we discern no due process 
violation on the record before us. "[W]hen there are 
premature deliberations among jurors with no allegations of 
external influence on the jury, the proper process for jury 
decisionmaking has been violated, but there is no reason to 
doubt that the jury based its ultimate decision only on 
evidence formally presented at trial." United States v. 
Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 690 (3d Cir. 1993) (emphasis in 
original). Given the extensive evidence of Szuchon's guilt of 
first-degree murder and the relative weakness of the 
evidence regarding his diminished-capacity, we have no 
reason to doubt that the jury's decision was based on the 
evidence. Szuchon has made no showing that he was 
prejudiced by the alleged premature deliberations. Cf. 
Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 
2000) ("Anderson's claim [of premature deliberations] must 
fail because there is absolutely no evidence that the alleged 
 
                                13 
 
 
misconduct has prejudiced Anderson in any way, much 
less `to the extent that he has not received a fair trial.' ") 
(citation omitted). Furthermore, the jury acquitted Szuchon 
on the charge of attempted murder of Aldo DeSanto, which 
suggests that it in fact gave due regard to the court's 
instructions and deliberated the evidence at the close of the 
trial. "When the jury is instructed to base its verdict solely 
on the evidence and it acquits the defendant of certain 
counts, such factors indicate that the jury was not biased." 
United States v. DiSalvo, 34 F.3d 1204, 1226 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(citing United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 156 (3d Cir. 
1993)). In short, the record indicates that the alleged 
premature deliberations did not deprive Szuchon of his 




Szuchon contends that his trial was unfair because the 
court ordered his legs and right hand shackled after he 
assaulted a Commonwealth witness. Szuchon leapt from 
his chair during the course of the trial and grabbed and 
kicked a state trooper who was leaving the witnesses stand. 
The assault occurred in full view of the jury, and court 
security subdued Szuchon on the floor in front of the jury 
box. As a result of the incident, and after hearing from 
counsel, the trial court ordered Szuchon shackled to his 
chair and counsel table for the remainder of the trial and 
sentencing. Szuchon's left hand remained unshackled so 
that he could take notes and assist counsel, and Szuchon 
was not gagged. 
 
In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), the Court 
recognized that a defendant is prejudiced when he appears 
before a jury in shackles: "Not only is it possible that the 
sight of shackles and gags might have a significant effect on 
the jury's feelings about the defendant, but the use of this 
technique is itself something of an affront to the very 
dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge 
is seeking to uphold." Id. at 344. The Court added, 
however, that sometimes "binding and gagging might 
possibly be the fairest and most reasonable way to handle" 
a disruptive defendant. Id. 
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The record here supports the decision to shackle 
Szuchon given his violent and disruptive behavior, 
particularly in light of the trial court's determination that 
certain jurors were palpably frightened of Szuchon following 
the assault. In addition to his assault upon the trooper, 
Szuchon had been verbally disruptive on two prior 
occasions during the trial. Szuchon had also become 
noticeably upset after hearing the testimony of an earlier 
prosecution witness, when he "attempted to get up from his 
seat . . ., and said either I can't take this shit[or] I don't 
have to tolerate this shit." App. 2920. After that earlier 
incident, the court allowed defense counsel to remove 
Szuchon from the courtroom for several minutes to calm 
himself down. Szuchon had thus displayed a pattern of 
disruptive conduct prior to the assault upon the trooper. 
 
The trial court carefully weighed but rejected alternatives 
to shackling, such as barring Szuchon from the courtroom 
or issuing a contempt citation. The court also considered 
but rejected the possibility of attempting to conceal the 
shackles from the jury, explaining as follows: 
 
       It's my opinion that a couple of jurors were so 
       frightened last night that it would be more productive 
       for them to know that he is in some fashion shackled 
       to his chair, and it is my belief that the possibilities of 
       the prejudicial effect of knowing that he is unable to 
       leave his chair are far less than the productive, if you 
       will, effect of them knowing that they can pay attention 
       to the evidence without having to worry about the 
       Defendant. 
 
App. 2921-2922. Szuchon's counsel stated that they had no 
objection to revealing the shackles to the jury, and counsel 
raised no objection to the court's cautionary instructions 
regarding the shackling.7 The record fully supports the trial 
court's decision. 
 
Szuchon contends that the shackling must have been 
unduly prejudicial. He cites to the declarations that he has 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Szuchon contends that counsel were ineffective in failing to object, 
but 
because the shackling was an appropriate sanction, the failure to object 
was not unreasonable. 
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obtained from two members of the jury, both of whom note 
that they "could not set aside the fact that Szuchon was 
shackled," and they add that another juror "was utterly 
terrified of Szuchon and believed that he would kill her and 
her family." Based on these statements, Szuchon contends 
that the shackling must have had a "substantial and 
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 
verdict." Br. of Cross-Appellant at 86. We find this 
argument unpersuasive. It seems unlikely that any juror 
could have ignored that Szuchon was shackled, and the 
trial court took that fact into consideration, noting its view 
that it would be better to reveal that Szuchon was shackled 
than to have the jury sit in fear that he would again spring 
forth and assault someone. And the jury certainly had 
reason to fear Szuchon because he had aggressively 
attacked a state trooper right in front of them. The trial 
court reasonably concluded that the shackling was 
warranted and that Szuchon's right to a fair trial would be 
better served by revealing the constraints. The court also 
carefully instructed the jury to remain focused solely on the 
evidence. The declarations from the two jurors cast no 
doubt upon the validity of the trial court's decision -- in 
fact, the declarations seem to verify the court's assessment 
that certain jurors were truly frightened and that shackling 
would help them to focus on the evidence rather than on 
Szuchon. We find no violation of due process. 
 
4. Notice of the Death Penalty 
 
Szuchon contends that he was provided inadequate 
notice that he faced the death penalty. He relies exclusively 
on Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991). In that case, the 
prosecution advised the defendant in a presentencing order 
that it would not seek the death penalty. At sentencing, 
there was no discussion of death as a possible sentence, 
and the defendant argued only the merits of various terms 
of imprisonment. The trial court sua sponte sentenced the 
defendant to death. The United States Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that the defendant was denied due 
process because he did not have "adequate notice of the 
critical issue that the judge was actually debating." Id. at 
120. The Court explained that "[n]otice of issues to be 
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resolved by the adversary process is a fundamental 
characteristic of fair procedure." Id. at 126. 
 
Szuchon's case is readily distinguishable from Lankford. 
The trial court formally notified Szuchon on the record at 
least a week before jury selection that he faced the death 
penalty. The notice was given at the same time that 
Szuchon's trial counsel were appointed (as will be 
discussed in more detail below), and thus Szuchon's 
counsel went to trial with as much notice of the death 
penalty as they possibly could have had under the 
circumstances. Moreover, Szuchon insisted on proceeding 
to trial with only one week for his counsel to prepare, as he 
refused to waive the 180-day speedy-trial rule. We would be 
hard-pressed, at the least, to distinguish the self-inflicted 
harm that Szuchon caused by refusing to continue the trial 
from any prejudice that might have resulted from his not 
having had more notice that this was a death penalty case. 
 
Szuchon has also made no showing that he was 
prejudiced by the alleged failure to have earlier notice: there 
is no evidence that either pre-trial counsel or trial counsel 
were hindered in their preparations due to the allegedly 
inadequate notice. Moreover, Szuchon makes no claim that 
he was unaware of the evidence and witnesses that were 
presented against him at trial and sentencing. Cf. Duvall v. 
Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 797-98 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding 
no due process violation even though state failed to afford 
defendant notice of evidence it intended to produce to 
establish its aggravating circumstance); Hale v. Gibson, 227 
F.3d 1298, 1236 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that there was 
no due process violation where state amended bill of 
particulars on first day of trial to add an aggravating 
circumstance that it had not previously noted). Nothing in 
this record suggests that the notice Szuchon received 
violated his right to due process. 
 
In sum, Szuchon has not made a substantial showing of 
the denial of a constitutional right on his due process 
claims, and we will deny a certificate of appealability. 
 
B. Psychiatric Evidence Claims 
 
Szuchon contends that he was denied his right under 
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), to the assistance of 
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a forensic psychiatrist at state expense. He also contends 
that, as to the psychiatric examination that was conducted, 
he was denied his right under Estelle v. Smith , 451 U.S. 
454 (1981), to be advised that his statements could be used 
against him at trial. Our analysis of these claims requires 
that we first summarize the relevant pre-trial events. 
 
After his preliminary arraignment, Szuchon privately 
retained his own counsel, who promptly filed a "Motion for 
Mental Health Examination." Counsel requested"an 
examination to determine [Szuchon's] present mental 
health status, and his present status as to competency." 
App. 331. He also asked that the court order "a 
determination as to [Szuchon's] criminal responsibility, as 
provided within the Mental Health Act." Id.  The trial court 
granted the motion and ordered that "any reports of any 
examination shall be supplied to the attorney for the 
Defendant and the Commonwealth." App. 333. 
 
Szuchon was transferred to Warren State Hospital, where 
he was examined by Dr. Walter Finken. The examination 
covered Szuchon's mental health, his competency to stand 
trial, and his "criminal responsibility." It is undisputed that 
Szuchon was not advised that his statements could be used 
against him at trial and sentencing. Doctor Finken's 
findings were reported to the trial court in a letter signed by 
Dr. Harold J. Reinhardt, also of Warren State Hospital. 
Copies of the letter (which we will refer to as the"Finken 
Report") were forwarded to the Commonwealth and to 
Szuchon's counsel. Doctor Reinhardt (who it is clear merely 
signed the letter, the letter actually contained the findings 
of Dr. Finken) advised the court as follows: Szuchon was 
competent to stand trial; he was not insane within the 
meaning of the M'Naughten test; although Szuchon 
indicated that he was on various drugs at the time of the 
offenses, there was no indication that he suffered from "a 
serious toxic confusion or psychotic state at the time"; and 
"[i]n interviewing the patient, one did not get the impression 
that he planned or obtained the gun with the specific 
purpose of shooting Judy." Supplemental Appendix 5. 
 
Thereafter, Szuchon filed a "Motion for Appointment of a 
Forensic Psychiatrist," noting that he was exploring an 
insanity defense but that he lacked sufficient funds to 
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retain a psychiatrist "who could examine the Defendant, 
and testify as to the Defendant's mental state and capacity 
at the time of the incident at Defendant's trial."  Szuchon 
then filed a "Notice of Insanity or Infirmity Defense" and 
advised that he would provide the name of any expert he 
would call after he received funds from the court to hire a 
psychiatrist. On September 3, 1981, after oral argument, 
the trial court denied without prejudice Szuchon's motion 
for appointment of a psychiatrist. The reasons for the 
court's ruling are not apparent in the record before us. 
 
On September 28, 1981, Szuchon's counsel moved to 
withdraw because Szuchon was refusing to cooperate in his 
defense and their relationship had deteriorated. The trial 
court granted the motion and advised Szuchon of the need 
to promptly retain new counsel. Although incarcerated, 
Szuchon was afforded numerous opportunities to contact 
his family by telephone to arrange for the hiring of a new 
attorney. Szuchon neglected to do so. On October 5, the 
trial court appointed two attorneys as Szuchon's counsel in 
the event Szuchon failed to hire his own. Szuchon 
consented to the court's appointment of counsel, App. 375- 
76, and he never privately retained counsel. At a hearing 
the next day, counsel lodged a motion to have Szuchon 
examined by Dr. David Paul, a local forensic psychiatrist. 
App. 1583. The trial court granted the motion. App. 377. In 
the days that followed, however, Szuchon refused to be 
examined because he claimed that Dr. Paul would be 
biased given his past work as a consultant for the Erie 
County Jail. 
 
Jury selection commenced on October 12, which was less 
than a week after Szuchon's counsel were appointed. 
Szuchon, however, insisted on proceeding to trial on that 
date, and he repeatedly refused a continuance. Szuchon 
claimed that his right to a speedy trial would be violated by 
any continuance, and thus he forced the trial to commence 
even after the court made it clear to him that his counsel 
would likely benefit from additional time to prepare. 
 
As noted, Szuchon presented a diminished-capacity 
defense, but he presented no expert mental-health 
evidence. The prosecution, in contrast, presented the 
testimony of Dr. Finken and introduced the Finken Report, 
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which contained numerous statements that Szuchon had 
made about his role in the murder and his mental status. 
The record is clear that the main purpose for which the 
prosecution used Dr. Finken's testimony and the Finken 
Report at trial was to establish that Szuchon acted with a 
specific intent, which, in the end, was the only disputed 
issue at trial given that Szuchon's defense was diminished 
capacity and he made no attempt to deny that he murdered 
Judy Snyder. 
 
With this background, we turn to the claims under Ake 
and Estelle. Szuchon contends that the trial court violated 
Ake insofar as Dr. Finken was the expert appointed to 
evaluate him, as Dr. Finken was not appointed to assist the 
defense. The Supreme Court held in Ake that,"when a 
defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at 
the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, 
the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access 
to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an 
appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, 
preparation, and presentation of the defense." 470 U.S. at 
83. Had Dr. Finken been the only psychiatrist appointed in 
this case, we would agree that Ake was not satisfied. The 
record reflects that the trial court never ordered Dr. Finken 
to assist the defense; Szuchon's counsel apparently had no 
contact and did not discuss possible defenses with Dr. 
Finken; and the Finken Report was addressed to, and 
clearly prepared for the benefit of, the court. Under Ake, 
"evaluation by a `neutral' court psychiatrist does not satisfy 
due process." Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1158 
(9th Cir. 1990). 
 
But Dr. Finken was not the only psychiatrist appointed, 
as the trial court granted Szuchon's request before trial to 
be examined by Dr. Paul. Szuchon simply refused to be 
examined by Dr. Paul and insisted on proceeding to trial 
with no expert evidence. Ake, however, requires only that a 
court provide "access" to an independent psychiatrist. Ake, 
470 U.S. at 83. Szuchon maintained that Dr. Paul would be 
biased, but Szuchon presented no evidence to substantiate 
that allegation. Moreover, we certainly could not infer that 
a bias might have existed given that it was Szuchon's 
counsel who expressly requested that Dr. Paul be 
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appointed. Counsel obviously had no objection to Dr. Paul's 
affiliation with the Erie County Jail, and there is absolutely 
no evidence that Dr. Paul would have been unable to assist 
the defense. On this record, the trial court satisfied Ake by 
granting Szuchon's request to be examined by Dr. Paul, an 
independent psychiatrist who was made available to the 
defense at state expense. We will deny a certificate of 
appealability on the Ake claim.8  
 
Szuchon next claims that he was denied his Fifth 
Amendment right under Estelle to be advised before his 
examination with Dr. Finken that his statements could be 
used against him. In Estelle, a state trial court ordered an 
evaluation to determine the defendant's competency to 
stand trial for capital murder. The defendant was not 
informed of his Miranda rights before the evaluation, was 
adjudged competent, and convicted. The defendant did not 
raise a mental-status defense, and he offered no psychiatric 
evidence. At the capital sentencing proceeding, the trial 
court allowed the state to present the psychiatrist's 
testimony concerning "future dangerousness." The 
psychiatrist testified based not only upon his observations 
of the defendant but also gave detailed descriptions of the 
defendant's statements about the crime. The Supreme 
Court vacated the death sentence, holding that "[a] criminal 
defendant who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor 
attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence may not be 
compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can 
be used against him at a capital sentencing proceeding." 
451 U.S. at 468. 
 
Szuchon argues that admission of Dr. Finken's testimony 
and the Finken Report violated his privilege against self- 
incrimination. He further claims that counsel were 
ineffective in failing to object to admission of this evidence.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The District Court denied relief on the ground that Ake could not 
apply retroactively to Szuchon's case. Szuchon's conviction, however, 
became final after Ake was decided, and thus Szuchon was entitled to 
the benefit of that decision. Nevertheless, just as we can affirm a 
judgment on the merits on an alternative basis, see, e.g., Felix v. Virgin 
Islands Gov't, 702 F.2d 54, 57 (3d Cir. 1983), we can deny a certificate 
of appealability on any ground with support in the record. 
 
9. The Commonwealth argues that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
rejected these claims in the third post-conviction proceeding as waived, 
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We will grant a certificate of appealability because Szuchon 
has shown that it is at least debatable whether admission 
of the Finken evidence was inconsistent with the holding in 
Estelle. On the merits, however, we need not decide 
whether the admission was in fact an Estelle violation, as 
any error, even assuming there was one, was undoubtedly 
harmless and insufficient to warrant habeas relief. Cf. 
Penry v. Johnson, 121 S. Ct. 1910, 1919-20 (2001) ("Even 
if our precedent were to establish squarely that the 
prosecution's use of the Peebles report violated Penry's Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, that error 
would justify overturning Penry's sentence only if Penry 
could establish that the error [was not harmless]"). 
 
A writ of habeas corpus may issue only if the reviewing 
court finds that the constitutional error "had a substantial 
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 
verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). 
Even absent Dr. Finken's testimony and the Finken Report, 
the Commonwealth presented overwhelming evidence of 
Szuchon's specific intent to kill. The Commonwealth 
established that Szuchon told numerous individuals before 
the murder that he planned to kill Judy Snyder. After the 
murder, Szuchon confessed to the police that he intended 
to kill Snyder because she would not return to being his 
girlfriend. The Commonwealth further established the 
deliberate manner in which Szuchon purchased the bullets 
and rifle the morning of the killing and later drove to the 
restaurant where Judy Snyder worked, waiting patiently for 
her in the parking lot while reading a newspaper. 10 Szuchon 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
and that Szuchon therefore committed a procedural default. We disagree. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied these claims solely on the 
merits, ruling that, "[s]ince appellant argued diminished capacity 
throughout the guilt and penalty phases. . ., his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination was not violated by Dr. Finken's 
psychiatric examination and subsequent testimony." 693 A.2d at 963. 
Thus, the merits are properly before us. 
 
10. The Finken Report actually benefitted Szuchon on this front, as the 
jury learned of Dr. Finken's opinion that, "[i]n interviewing the patient, 
one did not get the impression that he planned or obtained the gun with 
the specific purpose of shooting Judy." 
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kidnaped Snyder, DeSanto, and Sadowski at gunpoint, 
telling them, "If you all don't get into the car, I'll blow your 
fucking heads off." Szuchon, 484 A.2d at 1368. He kept the 
rifle trained on the three victims as he forced them to drive 
to a remote area, telling them to "make your act of 
contrition or say your confessions if you want to go to 
heaven because at the end of this night I'm surely going to 
hell." Id. He ordered Snyder to walk into a corn field, and 
when she refused, he shot her twice in the back. This 
evidence unequivocally established that Szuchon acted with 
a specific intent to kill Judy Snyder. 
 
Szuchon's evidence of diminished capacity, by contrast, 
was weak. Szuchon called three lay witnesses in his 
defense, none of whom testified to a diminished capacity on 
the date of the murder. The only evidence presented of a 
diminished capacity was the statements Szuchon had made 
to the police and to Dr. Finken. Szuchon told the police the 
day after the murder that he had ingested a "couple lines" 
of cocaine and "five to six [Q]uaalude tablets." He told Dr. 
Finken that he had taken "six to eight" Quaaludes and 
"some cocaine." (Of course, had the Finken evidence been 
excluded, the jury would only have had Szuchon's 
statements to the police.) There was no evidence that 
Szuchon consumed any alcohol or other drugs on the day 
of the murder. 
 
In Pennsylvania, a defendant who relies on evidence of 
drug consumption must show that he was "overwhelmed by 
an intoxicant to the point of losing his rationality, faculties, 
or sensibilities so as to negate or lower the specific intent 
to kill." Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 634 A.2d 1078, 1085 
(Pa. 1993) (citing Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 571 A.2d 
1035 (Pa. 1990)). Szuchon's evidence fell far short of that 
standard. At best, he showed that he ingested a small 
quantity of cocaine and several sedatives, but by no means 
could the jury have inferred from that limited evidence that 
Szuchon was overwhelmed to the point of losing his 
rationality. Moreover, the remainder of the trial evidence 
(excluding Dr. Finken) firmly established that Szuchon was 
well in control of his faculties. Every witness who had 
contact with Szuchon around the time of the murder-- 
including the rifle and bullet salesmen, DeSanto, Sadowski, 
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Pusch, and the arresting officers -- testified that Szuchon 
had seemed rational and showed no signs of intoxication or 
a drugged condition. Furthermore, the manner in which 
Szuchon carried out the murder strongly indicated that he 
knew what he was doing. 
 
Thus, while the jury might have found the Finken 
evidence compelling, the overwhelming remaining evidence 
of Szuchon's specific intent and the paucity of his 
diminished-capacity defense convince us that the outcome 
of this trial would have been exactly the same without Dr. 
Finken's testimony and the Finken Report. Similarly, 
Szuchon cannot show prejudice under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to support his claim that 
counsel were ineffective in failing to object to its admission. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's denial of 
relief on these claims.11 
 




We turn next to the sentencing phase and address first 
the Commonwealth's appeal of the District Court's issuance 
of the writ based on Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988). 
The Supreme Court held in Mills that a death sentence 
should be vacated as violative of the Eighth Amendment if 
there is a substantial probability that reasonable jurors, 
upon receiving the trial judge's instructions and attempting 
to complete the verdict form based on those instructions, 
may have thought that they could only consider those 
mitigating factors which they unanimously found to exist. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Szuchon also claims that Estelle was violated by admission of the 
psychiatric evidence at sentencing. We do not reach that claim given our 
disposition of this appeal, although we note that we discern no error in 
that regard. The Commonwealth used Dr. Finken's testimony and the 
Finken Report at sentencing solely in rebuttal to Szuchon's claims of 
mitigation based on his alleged mental deficiencies. Admission of the 
evidence for that purpose was not inconsistent with Buchanan v. 
Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 424 (1987) (holding that no Estelle violation 
occurs when the state uses a psychiatric report in rebuttal after the 
defendant places his mental status in issue). 
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486 U.S. at 376. The District Court concluded that the 
instructions at Szuchon's sentencing violated this principle. 
The Commonwealth argues that the Mills claim is 
procedurally defaulted because Szuchon never raised the 
claim in state court, his state remedies are now foreclosed, 
and he cannot show cause and prejudice or a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice. We agree that the claim is defaulted 
and barred from review on the merits.12  
 
Preliminarily, Szuchon argues that the procedural-default 
defense was waived because the Commonwealth failed to 
assert that defense in its answer to the amended petition. 
A state ordinarily is required to assert a procedural default 
in its answer if it intends to rely on that defense. See 
Esslinger v. Davis, 44 F.3d 1515, 1524 n.32 (11th Cir. 
1995) ("The state can waive a procedural bar to relief by 
explicitly waiving, or by merely failing to assert the bar in 
its answer to the habeas petition."); Reese v. Nix, 942 F.2d 
1276, 1280 (8th Cir. 1991) ("The district court properly held 
that Nix waived his procedural default defense by failing to 
affirmatively assert it in his answer to Reese's petition for 
habeas relief."); Delap v. Dugger, 890 F.2d 285, 302 n.20 
(9th Cir. 1989) ("The state did not raise the issue of 
procedural default in its response to Delap's habeas 
petition, and thus has waived procedural default."); see also 
Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87 (1997) (noting that"procedural 
default is normally a defense that the State is obligated to 
raise and preserve if it is not to lose the right to assert the 
defense thereafter"). 
 
On the record here, we see no reason to excuse the 
Commonwealth's failure to assert the default in its answer. 
We find, however, that the more troubling aspect of this 
case is Szuchon's failure to raise his Mills claim, or any sort 
of challenge to the jury instructions regarding unanimity in 
finding the mitigating circumstances, in any of his 
numerous state court proceedings. Thus, while the 
Commonwealth may well have waived its procedural-default 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The Commonwealth argues in the alternative that the Mills claim is 
barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), or without merit. Given 
our disposition on the procedural default, we do not reach those 
arguments. 
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defense, the fact remains that Szuchon deprived the state 
courts of the opportunity even to examine the Mills issue. 
We cannot ignore this fact and the resulting procedural 
default. We conclude, therefore, that the District Court 
should not have reached the merits of the Mills  claim. We 
reach this conclusion sua sponte given the substantial 
concerns of comity and federalism that are implicated by 
Szuchon's decision to bypass state court review altogether.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. A court of appeals can raise a procedural default sua sponte. Smith 
v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400, 408 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Windham v. Merkle, 
163 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1998); Ortiz v. Dubois , 19 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 
1994); Washington v. James, 996 F.2d 1442 (2d Cir. 1993); Hardiman v. 
Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1992). We retain this discretion 
because the doctrine of procedural default, while not a jurisdictional 
rule, "is grounded upon concerns of comity between sovereigns and often 
upon considerations of judicial efficiency." Hardiman, 971 F.2d at 503 
(citations omitted). "Because these concerns substantially implicate 
important interests beyond those of the parties, it is not exclusively 
within the parties' control to decide whether such a defense should be 
raised or waived." Id. In Smith, we explained that our discretion to 
address a default should be guided by the factors discussed in Granberry 
v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987), with respect to the sua sponte 
consideration of nonexhaustion. 120 F.3d at 408. Thus, we held that the 
values of comity, federalism, judicial efficiency, and the "ends of 
justice" 
must be weighed in determining whether to consider the default. Id. We 
noted that it might be inappropriate to raise a default where "it is 
evident 
that a miscarriage of justice has occurred," id., explaining that a 
miscarriage of justice in this context " `should include cases where the 
record is well developed and the merits strongly support the petitioner's 
claim.' " Id. (quoting Washington v. James, 996 F.2d 1442 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(Oakes, J., dissenting)). 
 
Smith was a capital case in which the petitioner claimed that the trial 
court issued erroneous jury instructions on the elements of first-degree 
murder. Although the petitioner might have waived that claim in state 
court, the Commonwealth in Smith did not argue a default at any stage 
of the habeas proceeding: "not in the district court, not in its briefing 
before this Court, and not at oral argument." 120 F.3d at 407. We 
declined to raise the matter sua sponte, noting that, "not only do the 
merits support Smith's claim, . . . but the record as it relates to the 
merits is as well-developed as it can be," whereas the record as to the 
default was "sparse" and would have required"not simply supplemental 
briefing but a remand to the district court for supplemental fact 
finding." 
120 F.3d at 409. Here, the Mills claim is similarly one of erroneous jury 
instructions and the record is fully developed, but unlike Smith, the 
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Szuchon's blatant default of his Mills claim essentially 
compels us to raise the issue sua sponte. The requirement 
that a prisoner afford the state courts a chance to correct 
an alleged constitutional violation before invoking federal 
jurisdiction is central to our federal system. As the 
Supreme Court has frequently explained, the exhaustion 
requirement " `is principally designed to protect the state 
courts' role in the enforcement of federal law[.]' " Duncan v. 
Walker, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 2128 (2001) (quoting Rose v. 
Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982)). "Comity thus dictates 
that when a prisoner alleges that his continued 
confinement for a state court conviction violates federal law, 
the state courts should have the first opportunity to review 
this claim and provide any necessary relief." O'Sullivan v. 
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). Moreover,"[t]he 
exhaustion rule promotes comity in that it would be 
unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal 
district court to upset a state court conviction without an 
opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional 
violation." Duncan, 121 S. Ct. at 2128 (quotation marks 
and citations omitted). 
 
That "unseemly" result, however, is precisely what would 
happen here, as we are asked to enforce the District Court's 
decision to overturn Szuchon's sentence even though 
Szuchon never afforded the state courts any chance to 
correct the alleged error. Significantly, we find no indication 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
record as to the default is also fully developed, and the parties briefed 
the default in both the District Court and in this Court. Our 
consideration of the default therefore would not require supplemental 
briefing or a remand. Moreover, we observed in Smith that "when the 
state has never raised an issue in either the district court or this Court 
we should be even less inclined to raise it sua sponte than when the 
state either has raised the issue here only belatedly or has raised it in 
the district court but has not pursued that line of attack in the court of 
appeals." 120 F.3d at 409. The Commonwealth never mentioned a 
default in Smith, but here it asserted the defense in its Objections to 
the 
Report and Recommendation and it has vigorously pursued it on appeal. 
Thus, aside from failing to assert the defense in its answer, the 
Commonwealth has done all it could do to raise the default. For these 
reasons, and for the reasons set forth in the text, we will address 
Szuchon's procedural default of the Mills claim. 
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that Szuchon made any effort to present a Mills  claim 
during his numerous state court proceedings, and it 
appears that Szuchon merely decided to skip the process of 
state court review, perhaps in the belief that he might 
obtain a more favorable result in federal court. We simply 
cannot overlook this attempt to nullify the state courts' vital 
role in preserving the constitutional rights of state 
prisoners. Cf. Windham, 163 F.3d at 1101 (reaching default 
sua sponte because "[i]t would be violative of comity and 
`our federalism' for this court to hold that the State of 
California violated the Equal Protection Clause by 
purposefully discriminating against women because of their 
gender when that issue was never presented to the trial 
court"). 
 
We reject Szuchon's suggestion that he exhausted a Mills 
claim. Szuchon argues that he presented the claim on 
direct appeal, but the record reflects that he merely 
challenged the trial court's alleged error in failing to 
elaborate on the meaning of the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, and in failing to read the language of every 
circumstance set forth in the statute. App. 431-33, 458-60. 
These claims, which were raised as matters of state law, did 
not put the state courts on notice that Szuchon wished to 
raise an Eighth Amendment challenge to the instructions 
regarding unanimity in the jury's finding of mitigating 
circumstances. Indeed, nowhere in his state appellate brief 
did Szuchon even mention, much less challenge, the trial 
court's use of the word "unanimous" in the instructions. 
Szuchon also contends that he exhausted a Mills  claim in 
the first post-conviction proceeding, but the claim he 
presented there, see App. 564, was merely an ineffective- 
assistance-of-counsel version of the claim from the direct 
appeal. Moreover, the claim was raised in a pro se petition 
that was superceded by a counseled petition, and counsel 
did not raise a Mills argument. 
 
Significantly, Szuchon offers no argument that he even 
attempted to raise a Mills claim in his second or third post- 
conviction proceedings, which is most troubling given that 
both of those proceedings were commenced long after Mills 
was decided. Indeed, the third proceeding was commenced 
in 1996 after this habeas proceeding was held in abeyance 
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at Szuchon's request so that he could pursue state 
remedies on three claims that he believed were 
unexhausted. See note 4, supra. Szuchon had raised a Mills 
claim in his habeas petition in 1994 and thus he knew of 
the claim at that time, see App. 176-77, yet he elected not 
to present the claim to the state courts even though he had 
as much reason to believe the Mills claim was unexhausted 
as he had for his other claims. On this record, the failure 
to exhaust the Mills claim is difficult to fathom. 
 
It would now be futile for Szuchon to return to state 
court to exhaust the Mills claim, and, further, review on the 
merits in federal court of this defaulted claim is barred 
because Szuchon cannot show cause or a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice to overcome the default. 14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Exhaustion will be excused as "futile" if "the state court would 
refuse 
on procedural grounds to hear the merits of the claims." Doctor v. 
Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 681 (3d Cir. 1996). State law must "clearly 
foreclose state court review of [the] unexhausted claims." Toulson v. 
Beyer, 987 F.2d 984, 987 (3d Cir. 1993). The only means of review for 
Szuchon's Mills claim would be through another PCRA petition, see 
Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581, 586 (Pa. 1999), but any such 
petition would be untimely and barred from consideration on the merits 
under the PCRA's one-year limitations period. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
S 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 911 (Pa. 2000) (holding 
that untimely petition raising Mills claim was properly dismissed for 
want of jurisdiction); see also Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d 408, 415 (3d 
Cir. 2001) ("Keller is barred from seeking further relief in state court 
because the statute of limitations for filing another PCRA petition has 
expired."). None of the three statutory exceptions to the PCRA time-bar 
even arguably apply to Szuchon's Mills claim. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
S 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). 
 
Szuchon relies on Commonwealth v. Cross, 726 A.2d 333 (Pa. 1999), 
and argues that state remedies are not clearly foreclosed. While the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did reach the merits in Cross of an 
otherwise seemingly time-barred Mills claim that was raised for the first 
time on the PCRA appeal, id. at 336-38, Szuchon's reliance on Cross is 
misplaced. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided a line of cases 
since Cross, starting with Commonwealth v. Banks, 726 A.2d 374, 376 
(Pa. 1999), in which it has held that the one-year period for filing under 
the PCRA is jurisdictional, and the only cognizable exceptions are those 
enumerated in the statute. We noted this development in Fahy v. Horn, 
240 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2001), where we observed that"the Pennsylvania 
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Consequently, we will not affirm the District Court's ruling 




Szuchon raises several sentencing claims on cross- 
appeal, but we need go no further than his claims under 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 15 Szuchon 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Supreme Court did not clarify that the state PCRA statute was 
jurisdictional and not waivable until 1999 in [ Banks]." Id. at 244; see 
also Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 164 n.17 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Prior to 
Banks there was some doubt as to the proper scope and application of 
the one year limitations period under the amended PCRA."). Given these 
more recent developments, we do not read Cross  to suggest that the 
state courts would reach the merits of Szuchon's Mills claim in an 
untimely filed PCRA petition. In fact, Szuchon has cited no case in which 
a court has relied on Cross to address the merits of a Mills claim despite 
the untimeliness of the petition. Cf. Pursell , supra. Thus, Cross 
notwithstanding, Szuchon's state remedies are clearly foreclosed. 
 
Exhaustion, therefore, can be excused as futile, but the Mills claim is 
defaulted because Szuchon failed to exhaust it despite ample 
opportunities to do so. See Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 
(1991). A federal court can reach the merits of a defaulted claim only if 
the petitioner shows cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage 
of justice. Lines, 208 F.3d at 166. Szuchon has offered no showing of 
cause or any adequate explanation for his failure to exhaust. To show a 
miscarriage of justice on a capital sentencing claim, the petitioner must 
demonstrate "actual innocence of the death penalty," which requires a 
showing "by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional 
error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for 
the 
death penalty under the applicable state law." Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 
U.S. 333, 336 (1992). This standard focuses on actual innocence of the 
minimum prerequisites that rendered the petitioner eligible for the death 
penalty (which in Pennsylvania are a conviction for first-degree murder 
and the finding of at least one aggravating circumstance, see 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. S 9711(c)(iv)), "and not on additional mitigating evidence 
that 
was prevented from being introduced as a result of a claimed 
constitutional error." Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 347. A Mills violation would 
have affected the jury only in its consideration of the mitigating 
evidence. 
Furthermore, Szuchon has made no claim of innocence on the 
underlying offense. Thus, Szuchon cannot show that a failure to address 
the Mills claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 
 
15. While ordinarily an appellee need not file a cross-appeal in order to 
rely upon any matter appearing in the record in support of the judgment 
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contends that the trial court improperly allowed the 
exclusion for cause of six prospective jurors who voiced 
opposition to the death penalty but who never expressed 
that their views would impair their ability to serve. The 
Commonwealth contends that the Witherspoon claims are 
defaulted, and thus we must address that argument first. 
 
1. Procedural Default 
 
Szuchon presented the Witherspoon claims on direct 
appeal, but the Commonwealth contends that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to reach the merits 
because Szuchon's counsel did not object to the exclusions 
at voir dire and did not raise the issue in post-verdict 
motions. Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected 
the claims on state procedural grounds, the Commonwealth 
contends that the claims are defaulted. Szuchon counters 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached the merits in 
accordance with its "relaxed waiver rule" in capital cases. In 
the alternative, he argues that the state procedural rules 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
below, see Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 137 n.5 (1982), this rule has a 
somewhat uncertain application when a habeas petitioner seeks 
affirmance on the basis of a constitutional claim post-AEDPA. Here, 
Szuchon has raised the Witherspoon issue by way of a cross-appeal, 
giving rise to the additional question as to whether a certificate of 
appealability is necessary. There is pre AEDPA caselaw to the effect that 
a certificate of probable cause was necessary in such a circumstance. 
See Roman v. Abrams, 790 F.2d 244, 245 (2d Cir. 1986) (per curiam). 
Post-AEDPA caselaw and commentary similarly points in that direction. 
See Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854, 862-63 (6th Cir. 2000) (petitioner in 
capital case granted certificate of appealability to raise trial and 
sentencing phase claims on cross-appeal from issuance of the writ on a 
Mills claim); Fretwell v. Norris, 133 F.3d 621, 623 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(dismissing cross-appeal where certificate of appealability denied); 
Williams v. Cain, 125 F.3d 269, 273 (5th Cir. 1997) (petitioner granted 
certificate of appealability on trial and sentencing phase claims on 
cross- 
appeal from grant of writ on capital sentencing claim); see also 16 Fed. 
Proc., L. Ed. S 41:528 (1999). The parties have not raised or briefed 
these 
issues. We need not, and do not, decide these issues, however, but will 
treat the cross-appeal as a request for certificate of appealability, and 
grant it, in view of the clear constitutional implications of the 
Witherspoon challenge. 
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were not consistently applied at the time of his 1981 trial, 
and thus there can be no procedural default for purposes 
of federal habeas review. 
 
The Commonwealth is correct that the state court 
rejected the Witherspoon claims on procedural grounds. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly held that, as to the 
six veniremen at issue, "the issue of whether[those] 
prospective jurors were improperly excluded under 
Witherspoon has been waived and cannot now be addressed 
for the first time on appeal." 484 A.2d at 1379. The court 
cited several of its prior (noncapital) cases and noted that 
it had "consistently found errors of constitutional 
dimension to have been waived." Id. It thus declined to 
reach the merits due to counsels' failure to raise the issue 
at the trial level. 
 
A habeas court "will not review a question of federal law 
decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests 
on a state law ground that is independent of the federal 
question and adequate to support the judgment." Coleman, 
501 U.S. at 729. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
procedural rules were independent of the Witherspoon 
claims, and thus we turn to whether the rules were 
"adequate to support the judgment." A procedural rule is 
adequate only if it is firmly established, readily 
ascertainable, and regularly followed. Ford v. Georgia, 498 
U.S. 411, 423-24 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 
(1989). In Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675 (3d Cir. 1996), we 
explained that a rule is adequate only under the following 
conditions: "(1) the state procedural rule speaks in 
unmistakable terms; (2) all appellate courts refused to 
review the petitioner's claims on the merits; and (3) the 
state courts' refusal in this instance is consistent with 
other decisions." Id. at 683-684; see also Dugger v. Adams, 
489 U.S. 401, 410 n.6 (1989) (explaining that a state must 
demonstrate that in the "vast majority of cases" the rule is 
applied in a "consistent and regular" manner); Hathorn v. 
Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 263 (1982) (explaining that a state 
rule should be applied "evenhandedly to all similar claims"). 
"[T]hese conditions must have existed at the time of the 
state court procedural default." Cabrera v. Barbo, 175 F.3d 
307, 313 (3d Cir. 1999). "The reason for these requirements 
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is that a petitioner should be on notice of how to present 
his claims in the state courts if his failure to present them 
is to bar him from advancing them in a federal court." Id. 
 
Szuchon allegedly defaulted the Witherspoon claims at 
trial in 1981. At that time, and indeed to this day, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has employed a doctrine of 
"relaxed waiver" whereby it will reach the merits of a claim 
on a direct appeal in a capital case even if the claim would 
otherwise be waived by the failure to raise it at the trial 
level. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rivera, 773 A.2d 131, 139 
n.7 (Pa. 2001) ("Technically, this claim is waived because 
counsel failed to make a timely objection to the jury 
instruction. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1119(b). However, because 
this is a capital case on direct appeal, we will nonetheless 
review the merits of this claim pursuant to the relaxed 
waiver rule.") (citations omitted). As the court explained in 
Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1998), 
"[r]elaxed waiver, as an operating principle, was created to 
prevent this court from being instrumental in an 
unconstitutional execution. Due to the unique severity and 
finality of the death penalty, this court has relaxed its 
waiver rules as to any claim raised on direct appeal for 
which the record permits review." Id. at 700 (citing 
Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1978); 
Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 454 A.2d 937 (Pa. 1982)). 
 
McKenna, which was decided before Szuchon's trial, was 
the seminal case on relaxed waiver. There, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court noted its longstanding general rule that a 
claim is waived on appeal when not preserved, but the 
court decided to "make a particular limited exception to the 
general rule requiring that an issue first be considered in 
the court of common pleas," noting "the public interest in 
assuring that the death sentence is imposed only in a 
constitutionally permitted manner. . . ." 383 A.2d at 180 
n.11. The court observed that, "because imposition of the 
death penalty is irrevocable in its finality, it is imperative 
that the standards by which that sentence is fixed be 
constitutionally beyond reproach." Id. at 181. The court 
explained that it had "a duty to transcend procedural rules 
which are not, in spirit, applicable, to the end that the 
public interest may be vindicated." Applying these relaxed 
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waiver principles, the court vacated a death sentence on 
the ground that the statute under which the defendant was 
sentenced was unconstitutional, even though the defendant 
had failed to preserve that issue. Id. at 179; see also 
Zettlemoyer, 454 A.2d at 942 n.3 (reaching the merits of 
claims that otherwise would have been waived and 
reaffirming the principle that " `imposition of the death 
penalty is irrevocable in its finality' and warrants, therefore, 
the relaxation of our waiver rules") (quoting McKenna, 383 
A.2d at 181). 
 
Here, the holding that Szuchon waived his Witherspoon 
claims by failing to raise them in the trial court is difficult 
to square with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's relaxed 
waiver rule.16 Indeed, the state court's opinion on Szuchon's 
direct appeal is notable for its failure to offer any 
discussion of relaxed waiver or even to cite McKenna, which 
rather firmly established that a claim of constitutional error 
in a capital case would not be waived by a failure to 
preserve it. Moreover, not one of the cases that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited to support the waiver 
was a capital case, see Szuchon, 484 A.2d at 1379-80, even 
though the court had held in McKenna that it would relax 
its waiver rules for capital defendants. Szuchon , in fact, 
appears to be the first reported decision in which the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a Witherspoon claim 
was waived by counsel's failure to preserve it, and 
subsequent decisions have relied on Szuchon as the case 
that established that precedent. E.g., Commonwealth v. 
Lewis, 567 A.2d 1376, 1381 (Pa. 1989) ("Although waiver of 
any claim in a capital case appears to be contradictory to 
the relaxed waiver rules afforded these appellants through 
Zettlemoyer, the case law of this Commonwealth is clear. 
This Court has repeatedly held that Witherspoon  claims are 
waivable.") (citing Commonwealth v. Peterkin , 513 A.2d 373 
(Pa. 1986), and Szuchon). But such a precedent setting use 
of a procedural bar indicates that the bar was not firmly 
established, readily ascertainable, and regularly followed at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Of course, the Mills claim, in contrast, was not waived at trial and 
later presented to the state supreme court; it was simply never raised at 
any level in the state courts. The relaxed waiver rule, therefore, has no 
application to the Mills claim. 
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the time of the purported default. See Reynolds v. 
Ellingsworth, 843 F.2d 712, 722 (3d Cir. 1988); see also 
Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 679 (5th Cir. 1981) ("We 
cannot enforce against Granviel a contemporaneous 
[Witherspoon] objection rule that apparently did not even 
exist at the time of his trial."). 
 
In short, the holding of a waiver on Szuchon's direct 
appeal was not "adequate to support the judgment" for 
purposes of a procedural default under federal habeas law. 
Accordingly, we will address the merits of the Witherspoon 
claims. 
 
2. Exclusion of Prospective Jurors 
 
The Court held in Witherspoon that "a sentence of death 
cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or 
recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for 
cause simply because they voiced general objections to the 
death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious 
scruples against its infliction. No defendant can 
constitutionally be put to death at the hands of a tribunal 
so selected." 391 U.S. at 522-23. Witherspoon 's holding is 
grounded in the right to a fair and impartial jury 
guaranteed to state criminal defendants by the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and thus veniremen can be 
excluded based on their views on capital punishment only 
if they would be biased and lack impartiality in hearing the 
case. In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), the Court 
held that "the proper standard for determining when a 
prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his 
or her views on capital punishment . . . is whether the 
juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his 
instructions and his oath.' " Id. at 424 (quoting Adams v. 
Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).17 The Court explained that: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. In Adams, the Supreme Court had applied the same standard and 
held that it violated Witherspoon to "exclude jurors who stated that they 
would be `affected' by the possibility of the death penalty, but who 
apparently meant only that the potentially lethal consequences of their 
decision would invest their deliberations with greater seriousness and 
gravity or would involve them emotionally," 448 U.S. at 49, and that it 
also violated Witherspoon to exclude jurors"only because they were 
unable positively to state whether or not their deliberations would in any 
way be `affected.' " Id. at 50. 
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       this standard . . . does not require that a juror's bias 
       be proved with "unmistakable clarity" . . . because 
       determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to 
       question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in 
       the manner of a catechism. What common sense 
       should have realized experience has proved: many 
       veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to 
       reach the point where their bias has been made 
       "unmistakably clear"; these veniremen may not know 
       how they will react when faced with imposing the death 
       sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish 
       to hide their true feelings. Despite this lack of clarity in 
       the printed record, however, there will be situations 
       where the trial judge is left with the definite impression 
       that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully 
       and impartially apply the law. 
 
Id. at 424-26 (footnote omitted). 
 
The Court explained in Witt that "[a]s with any other trial 
situation where an adversary wishes to exclude a juror 
because of bias, . . . it is the adversary seeking exclusion 
who must demonstrate, through questioning, that the 
potential juror lacks impartiality." 469 U.S. at 423. Thus, 
when the state wishes to exclude a prospective juror for 
cause because of his or her views on the death penalty, it 
must question that juror to make a record of the bias. See 
Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 652 n.3 (1987) ("A 
motion to excuse a venire member for cause of course must 
be supported by specified causes or reasons that 
demonstrate that, as a matter of law, the venire member is 
not qualified to serve.") (citation omitted). 
 
After the state offers its challenge for cause,"[i]t is then 
the trial judge's duty to determine whether the challenge is 
proper." Witt, 469 U.S. at 423. Thus, before it can sustain 
the exclusion, the judge must make a factual determination 
that the prospective juror would be biased. On federal 
habeas review, that determination of bias is entitled to the 
presumption of correctness. Id. at 428. As the Court 
emphasized in Witt, a trial judge's "predominant function in 
determining juror bias involves credibility findings whose 
basis cannot be easily discerned from an appellate record." 
Id. at 429; see also Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1499 
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(3d Cir. 1994) ("The trial court is in the best position to 
observe the demeanor of the prospective jurors."). 
 
The following colloquy was at issue in Witt: 
 
       [Q. Prosecutor:] Now, let me ask you a question, 
       ma'am. Do you have any religious beliefs or personal 
       beliefs against the death penalty? 
 
       [A:] I am afraid personally but not-- 
 
       [Q]: Speak up, please. 
 
       [A]: I am afraid of being a little personal, but definitely 
       not religious. 
 
       [Q]: Now, would that interfere with you sitting as a 
       juror in this case? 
 
       [A]: I am afraid it would. 
 
       [Q]: You are afraid it would? 
 
       [A]: Yes, Sir. 
 
       [Q]: Would it interfere with judging the guilt or 
       innocence of the Defendant in this case? 
 
       [A]: I think so. 
 
       [Q]: You think it would. 
 
       [A]: I think it would. 
 
       [Q]: Your honor, I would move for cause at this point. 
 
       [COURT:] All right. Step down. 
 
469 U.S. at 415-16. Based on this exchange, the Supreme 
Court held that the judge's finding of bias, although not 
free of ambiguity, was fairly supported and therefore 
presumptively correct. The Court explained that the judge 
was not required "to announce for the record that[the 
prospective juror] was biased, or his reasoning," id. at 430, 
and added that, "[i]n this regard it is noteworthy that in 
this case the court was given no reason to think that 
elaboration was necessary; defense counsel did not see fit 
to object to [the] recusal, or attempt rehabilitation." Id. at 
430-31. The Court noted that counsel's failure to speak was 
a circumstance that it would consider when assessing 
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respondent's belated claims that the situation was"so rife 
with ambiguity . . . as to constitute constitutional error." Id. 
at 431 n.11. 
 
Under Witt, therefore, the proper inquiry on pre-AEDPA 
habeas review of a Witherspoon claim is whether there is 
fair support in the record for the judge's finding that the 
prospective juror's views on the death penalty would have 
prevented or substantially impaired the performance of his 
or her duties as a juror in accordance with the instructions 
and oath. We must factor the decision of Szuchon's counsel 
to state "no objection" to the exclusions into our 
assessment of the transcript.18 As noted, Szuchon takes 
issue with the exclusion of six prospective jurors, but we 
conclude that there is no need to address all six, as the 
improper exclusion of even one veniremen in violation of 
Witherspoon warrants relief. See Gray, 481 U.S. at 657-68 
(holding that erroneous exclusion of one potential juror 
based on her views on the death penalty was reversible 
constitutional error); see also United States v. Chanthadara, 
230 F.3d 1237, 1268 (10th Cir. 2000) ("Because the 
erroneous exclusion of even one potential juror mandates 
reversal of a death sentence, our analysis takes us no 
further than potential juror Joy Phillips."); Fuller v. 
Johnson, 114 F.3d 491, 500 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Where the 
court finds that even one juror was improperly excluded, 
the defendant is entitled to a new sentencing, because the 
right to an impartial adjudication is `so basic to a fair trial 
that [its] infraction can never be treated as harmless 
error.' ") (quoting Gray, 481 U.S. at 668). We will focus, 
therefore, solely on the exclusion of Floyd Rexford. The 
relevant portion of Rexford's voir dire is as follows: 
 
       [Prosecutor]: If the evidence were to establish, sir, a 
       case of first degree murder, in other words, the type of 
       case that would show that Mr. Szuchon shot and killed 
       that woman intentionally, that he did it with malice 
       and that he did it with premeditation and those are the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Szuchon also raises a claim that counsel were ineffective in failing 
to 
object to each prospective juror's exclusion or to attempt rehabilitation. 
Because we find a violation of Witherspoon per se, we need not reach the 
ineffectiveness claim. 
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       elements of first degree murder, would you have any 
       conscientious scruple or any hesitation to find him 
       guilty of first degree murder? 
 
       [A]: I do not believe in capital punishment. 
 
       [Q]: You do not believe in capital punishment? 
 
       [A]: No. 
 
       [Q]: I challenge for cause, your Honor. 
 
       [Defense Counsel]: No objection. 
 
       [Prosecutor]: Thank you, Mr. Rexford. 
 




This limited questioning provided no evidence that 
Rexford's lack of belief in capital punishment would have 
prevented or substantially impaired his ability to apply the 
law. As the Court emphasized in Adams v. Texas , "it is 
clear beyond peradventure that Witherspoon is not a 
ground for challenging any prospective juror. It is rather a 
limitation on the State's power to exclude: if prospective 
jurors are barred from jury service because of their views 
about capital punishment on `any broader basis' than 
inability to follow the law or abide by their oaths, the death 
sentence cannot be carried out." 448 U.S. at 47-48. 
Rexford's mere lack of a belief in capital punishment was a 
"broader basis" for exclusion than inability to follow the 
law. Indeed, "those who firmly believe that the death 
penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors in 
capital cases so long as they state clearly that they are 
willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in 
deference to the rule of law." Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 
162, 176 (1986). Neither the Commonwealth nor the trial 
court, however, questioned Rexford about his ability to set 
aside his beliefs or otherwise perform his duty as a juror. 
As a result, there was no evidence or even a suggestion that 
Rexford would act in a biased fashion due to his lack of 
belief in capital punishment, and the trial court, therefore, 
failed in its duty to determine that there was a proper basis 
for the exclusion. Cf. Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 330-32 
(6th Cir. 2001) (holding that exclusion violated Witherspoon 
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because "[n]otwithstanding the deference owed to the trial 
judge, we find that the factual record does not fairly 
support [the prospective juror's] exclusion under the 
standards of Adams and Witt";"[the prospective juror] not 
once stated that his beliefs would deter him from serving as 
an impartial juror"). Thus, while we begin with the 
presumption that the trial court's determination of bias is 
correct, that presumption cannot adhere in the absence of 
record support for the exclusions. 
 
Our precedents are not to the contrary. In Lesko v. 
Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527 (3d Cir. 1991), for example, the 
prospective juror "initially stated to the prosecutor that she 
would be willing to vote for the death penalty in a proper 
case," id. at 1548, but "provided an ambiguous response to 
defense counsel's query about whether `irrespective of the 
evidence' she would `vote automatically for the death 
penalty' for a defendant convicted of murdering a police 
officer." Id. The judge then queried the prospective juror, 
and she "responded affirmatively to the court's inquiry 
about whether `under all circumstances' and `irrespective of 
[the] evidence' her opposition to capital punishment would 
prevent her from participating in a decision to impose the 
death penalty." Id. Under those circumstances, we held that 
the judge did not err in excluding the prospective juror 
because the "statements on voir dire establish[ed] a 
likelihood that her opposition to capital punishment would 
have substantially impaired her ability to comply with the 
trial court's sentencing instructions." Id.  Here, in contrast, 
no reasonable inference can be drawn that Rexford's lack of 
belief in capital punishment would have prevented or 
impaired his ability to follow the court's sentencing 
instructions. Even affording the trial court the deference it 
is owed in its assessment of Rexford's credibility and 
demeanor, and even accepting that juror bias need not be 
proved with "unmistakable clarity," the determination of 
bias in this case is unsupported. 
 
The District Court concluded that the six exclusions 
(including Rexford's) were proper under Witt because "in 
each instance, the prospective juror was unable to look 
past the possible imposition of the death penalty to answer 
the specific question posed and each of the prospective 
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jurors expressed unwillingness to sentence this defendant 
to die for the crime of first degree murder." We find no 
support in the record for this conclusion. The question 
posed did not probe willingness to vote in a certain way, 
but, rather, sought out any scruples or hesitation. Rexford 
apparently interpreted the question as seeking his views 
and, in responsive fashion, he noted his lack of belief.19 At 
that point, Rexford's views on the death penalty became the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. The five other veniremen at issue -- Chalupczynski, Buczek, Howard, 
Dobruk, and Settino -- likewise seemed to believe the question sought 
their views on the death penalty. Katherine Buczek's voir dire, for 
example, was as follows: 
 
       [Prosecutor]: If the evidence were to establish a case of first 
degree 
       murder, . . . if you found that and the evidence justified that 
       finding, would you have any conscientious scruple, any moral belief 
       or any hesitation against finding him guilty of first degree 
murder? 
 
       [A]: I have to ask a question. 
 
       [Q]: Go ahead. 
 
       [A]: Does that involve capital punishment? 
 
       [Q]: Yes, that is my next question. 
 
       [A]: Because I so indicated on the questionnaire that I received 
       concerning jury duty that I was opposed to capital punishment. 
 
       [Q]: Okay. I believe that I knew that also, and that is where I was 
       headed for with that question. You are opposed to capital 
       punishment, ma'am? 
 
       [A]: Yes, and I have been actively opposed to it in circulating 
       petitions. 
 
       [Q]: Okay. 
 
       [A]: And things of that nature. 
 
       [Q]: In connection with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund? 
 
       [A]: Right. 
 
       [Q]: I challenge for cause, your Honor. 
 
       [Defense counsel]: No objection. 
 
       [Court]: Thank you, ma'am. 
 
App. 1892-93 (emphasis added). 
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issue, and the prosecutor asked, "You do not believe in the 
death penalty?" Rexford simply replied "no," and the 
prosecutor moved to exclude him. The prosecutor failed, 
however, to meet his burden under Witt of asking even a 
limited number of follow-up questions to show that 
Rexford's views would render him biased. Thus, the only 
supportable inference on this record is that Rexford was 
excluded because he voiced opposition to the death penalty. 
Rexford also did not "express unwillingness" to impose the 
death penalty. He merely stated that he did not"believe" in 
capital punishment, which is by no means the equivalent of 
being unwilling to impose it. Again, even those firmly 
opposed to the death penalty can serve as jurors if they are 
"willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in 
deference to the rule of law." Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 176. 
 
In short, Rexford's exclusion violated Szuchon's rights 
under Witherspoon. It is settled that a Witherspoon violation 
is not subject to harmless error analysis. Gray , 481 U.S. at 
668; Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 (1976). It is of no 
moment, therefore, that the Commonwealth had seven 
unused peremptory challenges with which it could have 
struck the six prospective jurors. See Gray, 481 U.S. at 664 
(rejecting the argument that "a Witherspoon  violation 
constitutes harmless error when the prosecutor has an 
unexercised peremptory challenge that he states he would 
have used to excuse the juror"). The relief that must be 
afforded is a new sentencing proceeding. Witherspoon, 391 
U.S. at 523 n.21; see Fuller, 114 F.3d at 500. Accordingly, 
we will affirm, on alternative grounds, the District Court's 




To summarize, we will DENY a certificate of appealability 
on all claims of trial error other than the Estelle claims; we 
will AFFIRM the District Court's denial of relief on the 
Estelle claims; the Mills claim is procedurally defaulted, but 
we will AFFIRM, on the basis of Witherspoon, the District 
Court's issuance of the writ conditioned upon the 
Commonwealth's right to conduct a new sentencing 
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proceeding within 120 days or impose a sentence of life 
imprisonment. 
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